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Federal Income Taxation -DEDUCTIBILITY
OF CONSTRU
CTION-RELATED
DEPRECIATION
- Comrnzsszoner v. Idaho Power Co., 94 S. Ct. 2757
(1974).
T h e taxpayer, Idaho Power Co., is a public utility engaged in the production, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity. During 1962
and 1963 the taxpayer used certain transportation equipment that it
owned to construct capital improvements. On its books, the taxpayer
capitalized the portion of the depreciation on its equipment that related
to such construction, as required by the Federal Power Commission.l
For income tax purposes, however, the taxpayer deducted depreciation
on the construction-related equipment over the depreciable life of the
equipment, in reliance upon section 167(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.2 T h e Commissioner disallowed the deduction, principally on the grounds that, pursuant to section 263(a), depreciation on
such equipment is a nondeductible capital expendi ture.3 T h e Tax
Court upheld the Commissioner's determination,4 but the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that depreciation is specifically
deductible under section 167(a)and is not "an amount paid out" within
the meaning of section 263(a).5 The United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, holding that depreciation on
equipment used to construct capital improvements must be capitalized
and deducted over the depreciable lives of the capital improvement^.^
In so holding, the Court announced that depreciation is within the
scope of section 263(a), and that sections 161 and 261 indicate that
section 263 takes precedence over section 167 (a).

A. T h e Internal Revenue Code
The two sections commonly used in determining the tax treatment of
construction-related depreciation are section 167 in part VI and section
263 in part IX. Section 167 allows a depreciation deduction for exhauslFPC Reg., 18 C.F.R. 293-94 (1974).
T h e Idaho Public Utilities Commission has adopted these procedures and also requires the
taxpayer to capitalize construction-related depreciation. See 10 IDAHOCODEANN.9s 61-523,
24 (1947).
2All references in the text to "section" or "sections," unless otherwise indicated, refer to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended.
3The Commissioner also asserted that section 167(a) does not apply to construction-related
depreciation because the taxpayer was not in the "trade or business" of constructing its own
assets. See note 11 infra.
4Idaho Power Co., 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 383 (1970), rev'd, 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2757 (1974).
5Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2757 (1974).
GCommissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 94 S. Ct. 2757 (1974).
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tion, wear, and tear of property used in the trade or business.' In
contrast, section 263 disallows deductions for any "amount paid out" for
The terms "trade or business" and "amount
capital impro~ements.~
paid out" are not defined in the Code. Nevertheless, the commissioner
has contended that most taxpayers who claim depreciation on equipment
used to construct capital improvements do not qualify for section 167
treatment because they are not engaged in the "trade or business" of
constructing capital improvements.9 Furthermore, the Commissioner
has contended that depreciation is an "amount paid out" within the
meaning of section 263.l0
Courts have usually accepted the Commissioner's argument that most
taxpayers are not in the "trade or business" of constructing their own
capital improvements.ll In the instant case, however, the Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument, implying that all activities that are appropriate
to a taxpayer's principal business are part of its "trade or business"
under section 167.12 The Commissioner conceded this issue on
7 1 ~REV.
~ . CODEOF 1954,$ 167(a).
There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) (1) of property used in the trade or business. . . .
~ I N TREV.
. CODEOF 1954,s 263(a).
No deduction shall be allowed for (1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate.
Id. (emphasis added).
9Rev. Rul. 59-380, 1959-2CUM.BULL.87,88 (1959).
[TI he building equipment used in the construction cannot be considered as property
used in the regular trade or business of the taxpayer. . . Depreciation sustained on construction equipment owned by a taxpayer and used on the erection of capital improvements for its own use is not an allowable deduction . . . .
"The Commissioner's position is based on Treas. Reg. 5 1.263(a)-2(a) (1958) which states:
T h e following paragraphs of this section include examples of capital expenditures:
(a) The cost of acquisition, construction or erection of buildings, machinery and equipment, furniture and fixtures, and similar property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year.
Id. (emphasis added).
"In Great Northern Ry., 30 B.T.A. 691 (1934), a depreciation deduction on equipment
used in self-construction of capital assets was allowed because the equipment was used in a
trade or business of the taxpayer. This view apparently prevailed until 1959 when the IRS
ruled that equipment used in self-construction must be used in the taxpayer's regular trade or
business in order for related depreciation to be deductible. T h e Court of Claims followed this
test in Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222, 1264-69 (Ct. C1. 1969) in
denying a depreciation deduction because the equipment used in self-construction was not
used in the trade or business. T h e court of appeals in the instant case disagreed with the 1959
IRS ruling and allowed a deduction for depreciation taken on equipment used in selfconstruction of capital improvements. T h e court emphasized the continuity and regularity of
the taxpayer's construction activities, thereby inferring a "trade or business" must consist of
more than occasional self-construction activities. See cases cited at Commissioner v. Idaho
Power Co., 94 S. Ct. 2757,2762 n.5.
12477F.2d at 696.
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appeal to the Supreme C o u r t F
Most courts have also accepted the Commissioner's position that
construction-related depreciation is an "amount paid out" within the
meaning of section 263(a). In L. W. Brooks, Jr.,14 for example, the Tax
Court concluded that in the cost of producing income, depreciation is
as much an "expenditure" as the cost of labor or other items of direct cost.
Nevertheless, in construing other Code sections where similar language
is employed, courts have indicated that depreciation is not "paid out."
For example, section 170(a)(l) allows a charitable deduction for any
charitable contribution "payment of which is made within the taxable
year." In Orr v . United States, the Fifth Circuit held that depreciation
is not a "payment" because no transfer of money or property occurs.l5
Section 2 13(a)(l) allows, under certain conditions, a deduction for
"expenses paid" for medical care and insurance premiums. In Maurice
S. Gordon,16 the Tax Court reasoned that depreciation is not an "expense paid" within the plain meaning of that term, but a decrease in
value.
The Court of Claims followed the Commissioner's interpretation of
"trade or business" in Southern Natural Gas Co. v . United States.17 I n
that case, the taxpayer used its automotive equipment in constructing
additions to pipeline facilities. The Court of Claims held that the taxpayer was not in the "trade or business" of constructing pipelines and
that the term "amount paid out" included depreciation sustained on
construction-related equipment. The Tax Court in the instant case
followed Southern Natural Gas in reasoning that the taxpayer was not in
the "trade or business" of constructing its own capital improvements.
The Tax Court also accepted the reasoning in L. W. Brooks, Jr., that
depreciation is an "expenditure" and, by equating "expenditure" with
"amount paid out, required the taxpayer to capitalize its constructionrelated depreciation. However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the
Tax Court and, based upon Orr and Gordon, concluded that depreciation is not "an amount paid out" within the plain meaning of the term,
but is a "decrease in value. "18
The pertinent sections of the Code are contained in parts VI and IX,
subchapter B, chapter 1, subtitle A. Part VI commences with section
161,lg which states that the items specified in part VI are subject to the
"

1394 S. Ct. at 2762 n.5.
'450 T.C. 927 (1968), reu'd on other grounds, 424 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1970).
l50rr V. United States, 343 F.2d 533, 556 (5th Cir. 1965); accord, Clinton H. Mitchell, 42
T.C. 953, 973 (1964). See also Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960).
'637 T.C. 986 (1962).
I7412 F.2d 1222, 1264459 (Ct. C1. 1969).
'8477 F.2d at 694-95.
1 9 1 ~&v.
~ . CODEOF 1954,s 161.
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exceptions provided in part IX. Part IX commences with section 26 1,
which provides that no deduction is allowed in respect to the items
specified in part IX.20 However, until the instant case, sections 161 and
261 have not been construed as establishing the priority of part IX over
part VI. On the contrary, sections 161 and 261 were viewed as simple
references between separate parts of the Code.
Mertens indicates that section 161:
[Hlas no independent substantive impact. Under it, statutory permission is granted for the deduction of the specific items indicated in Part
VI of Subchapter B. As is evident, this provision is largely a mechanical
drafting device making certain that there is legal authority for the allowable deductions indicated.21

According to Mertens, section 261 has a similar purpose:
As a mechanical drafting matter having no independent substantive
impact, Section 261 disallows a deduction from gross income for those
items specified in Part IX of Subchapter B of the 1954 Code. This section
corresponds to Section 24(a) of the 1939 Code.22

B. Code Treatment of Similar Items
Other construction-related expenses are treated in a variety of ways,
either by express Code provision or by administrative and judicial interpretation. For example, the costs of labor, materials, and tools are
required to be capitalized and depreciated over the life of the constructed
5
asset. On the other hand, interesc23 losses,24sales and use t a ~ e s , ~and
pension plan contributions26 are all deductible in the year actually
incurred. Certain taxes and other carrying charges may be capitalized
or currently deducted at the taxpayer's option.27 Research and experi--

-

--

I n computing taxable income.. . there shall be allowed as deductions the items specified
in this part, subject to the exceptions provided in part IX (sec. 261 and following, relating
to items not deductible).
2 0 1 ~&v.
~ . CODEOF 1954,s 261.
In computing taxable income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of the
items specified in this part.
21J. MERTENS,
FEDERAL
INCOME
TAXATION,
CODE COMMENTARY
5 161 (Malone ed. 1973).
22Zd.8 261.
2 3 1 ~ rh. v . CODEOF 1954, 9 165; see INT. kv.CODEOF 1954, 9 266 (interest as a carrying
charge may be deducted or capitalized at the taxpayer's option); Rev. Rul. 70-88, 1970-1
CUM.BULL.32 (interest during construction deductible even though capitalized on taxpayer's
books as required by federal regulatory agency).
2 4 1 ~%v.
~ . CODEOF 1954, 9 165; see All-Steel Equipment, Inc., 54 T.C. 1749, 1759 (1970),
rev'd in part, 467 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1972).
2 5 1 ~&v.
~ . CODEOF 1954, § 164; see INT.h v . CODEOF 1954, § 266 (sales and use taxes as
carrying charges may be deducted or capitalized at the taxpayer's option).
2 6 1 ~REV.
~ . CODEOF 1954,s 404; see I. T. 3408, 1940-2 CUM.BULL.178 (1940).
2 7 1 ~&v.
~ . CODEOF 1954,s 266.
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mentation expenses28are among a group of items specifically exempted
from capitalization by section 263 .29

C. Accounting Theory
In an effort to determine the scope of the depreciation deduction, the
Supreme Court has espoused two ostensibly differing theories of depreciation. The "replacement theory," which the Ninth Circuit stressed
in the instant case,30originated in the early case of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water c 0 . 3 ~where the Supreme Court emphasized the role of
depreciation in providing a sufficient sum out of earnings for replacement of a consumed or obsolete asset. In Hertz Corp. v . United State~,3~
however, the Supreme Court formulated a "benefit theory" which emphasizes the allocation of the expense of using an asset to the various
periods "benefited" by that asset.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (A1CPA)
defined depreciation accounting in Accounting Terminology Bulletin
No. 1 as a system of accounting which aims to distribute the cost of
tangible capital assets over the estimated useful life of the unit in a
systematic and rational manner.33 The AICPA, however, has never
dealt specifically with construction-related depreciation. Accountants
agree that direct costs, such as materials and labor, incurred in construction of a capital asset should be capitalized, but they disagree on the
propriety of capitalizing overhead costs, including depreciation, that
relate to construction a~tivities.3~
The Federal Power Commission establishes utility rates based upon a
utility's "net investment" in plant and facilities. T o arrive at "net in2 8 1 ~REV.
~ . CODEOF 1954, $ 174.
~ ~ I NREV.
T . CODEOF 1954, $5 174 (research and experimentation expenses), 175 (soil and
conservation expenses), 180 (expenses for fertilizer etc.), 182 (expenditures by farmers for
clearing land), 616 (expenditures for the development of mines or deposits).
30477 F.2d at 690-91.
3l212 U.S. 1, 13 (1909).
[A] company is entitled to earn a sufficient sum annually to provide not only for current
repairs, but for making good the depreciation and replacing the parts of the property
when they come to the end of their life. T h e company is not bound to see its property
gradually waste, without making provision out of earnings for its replacement.
See Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98, 101 (1943); Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2757 (1974). See also Treas. Reg.
9 1.167(a)-l(a) (1972).
32364 U.S. 122, 126 (1960).
PRINCIPLES,
ACCOUNTING
TERMINOLOGY
BULLETIN
NO. 1 - REVIEW
332 APB ACCOUNTING
AND RESUME
7 56, at 9513 (1973).
34G. JOHNSON
8C J. GENTRY,
FINNEY
AND MILLER'S
PRINCIPLES
OF ACCOUNTING
- INTERMEDIATE 381 (7th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as FINNEY
AND MILLER]
; W. MEIGS,A. MOSICH,
C.
JOHNSON, & T . KELLER,INTERMEDIATE
ACCOUNTING
368 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
MEICS]
.
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vestment," the FPC has developed a Uniform System of Accounts
that specifies which items must be capitalized and included in the
capital asset accounts.35 This practice assures the utilities under the
FPC's control a fair return on invested capital based upon uniformly
applied standards.36 The FPC's Uniform System of Accounts requ res
all utilities to capitalize construction-related depreciation.37
COURT'S
DECISION
11. THESUPREME
In beginning its analysis, the Supreme Court announced that its
"primary concern'' was to "treat construction-related depreciation in a
manner which comports with accounting and taxation realities."38 The
Court reasoned that depreciation represents the cost of physical consumption39 of a capital asset and that a depreciation deduction represents
an attempt to allocate the expense of using an asset to the various periods
benefited by that asset. Based upon these premises, the Court reasoned
that construction-related depreciation benefits the entire period of the
constructed asset's useful life and should be capitalized over that period.
T h e Court contrasted its "benefit theory" of depreciation with the
"replacement theory" adopted by the Ninth Circuit in the instant case.
According to the Court, replacement was rejected as the "strict and sole
purpose of d e p r e ~ i a t i o n "in~ ~United States v . Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.4l
Additionally, the Court said that if replacement is the dominant purpose
of depreciation, the asset to be replaced is the constructed improvement,
not the equipment used to build it.
T o bolster its reasoning, the Court pointed out that other constructionrelated expenses such as the costs of tools, materials, and labor are included in the cost of a constructed facility rather than deducted in the
year of actual payment. The Court reasoned that construction-related
depreciation, like these direct costs, is finally disposed of in the constructed capital asset. Further, the Court reasoned, requiring the taxpayer to depreciate the equipment over the longer life of the constructed
improvements prevents the distortion of income and maintains tax parity
between a taxpayer that constructs its own capital facilities and a taxpayer that does not.
3516 U.S.C. $5 796(13), 797(b), 813,825(a),(c) (1960).
Power Co. v. FPC, 134 F.2d 602,609 (5th Cir. 1943).
3'FPC Reg., 18 C.F.R. 293-94 (1974).
3894 S. Ct. at 2763.
39But see 4 J. MERTENS,
FEDERAL
INCOME
TAXATION
$8 23.38-.42 (Malone ed. 1973). Physical
consumption is but one cause of depreciation, others include economic changes, the normal
progress of the art, invention and other current developments, local conditions peculiar to the
taxpayer and trade or business, and taxpayer's policy as to repairs, renewals, and replacements.
4O94 S. Ct. at 2764.
41412U.S. 401,415 (1973).
36See Alabama
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The Court also noted that federal and state regulatory agencies require the taxpayer to use accounting procedures that capitalize con~ ~ Court conceded that in determinstruction-related d e p r e c i a t i ~ n .The
ing tax questions, little attention, if any, is ordinarily given to combut the Court relied upon section 446 which
pulsory agency practice~,~3
states: "Taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books" unless the method "does not clearly reflect
income."44 T h e Court concluded that if the agency accounting practice
clearly reflects income, it is "almost presumptively controlling of federal
income tax consequences. "45
After focusing on accounting theory and regulatory practices, the
Court analyzed the pertinent sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
The Court acknowledged that a literal application of section 167 would
allow the depreciation deduction.46 Hence, the critical issue was whether
section 263, requiring capitalization, also applied, and if it did, how the
conflict between the two sections should be resolved. The Court held
that section 263(a) does apply to construction-related depreciation,
thereby rejecting two of the taxpayer's contentions previously accepted
by the court of appeals. In doing so, the Court asserted that depreciation
is an "amount paid out" within the meaning of section 263(a), and noted
that the regulations indicate "amounts paid out" include costs of
acquisition.47 The Court considered the regulation as an administrative
understanding that "amount paid out" is equivalent in meaning to
"cost incurred. " By adopting this construction, the Court reasoned that
depreciation is "paid out" in the same sense as are amounts expended for
materials and labor. Moreover, the Court announced that certain decisions48 construing sections 170 and 2 13, which indicate depreciation is
not an "amount paid out," are irrele~ant.~S
The Court resolved the conflict between section 167(a)which requires
deduction and section 263(a) which requires capitalization by holding
that section 263(a) takes priority over section 167(a) when the literal
requirements of each are fulfilled. The Court also stated that the wording of section 161, "subject to the exceptions provided in Part IX,"

42See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
43See Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552,562 (1932).
CODEOF 1954,s 446.
4 4 1 ~ rREV.
.
4594 S. Ct. at 2766.
4694 S. Ct. at 2762 n.5.
47Seenote 10 supra.
48Seenotes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
4994 S. Ct. at 2766 n.11. The Court said that these cases concerned the timing of an expenditure and have no relevance to rhe issuc:of capitalization.
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indicates that any section in part IX takes precedence over any section in
part VI.50
Finally, the Court recognized the congressional intent involved in the
1954 Code to provide for liberalization of depreciation, but rejected the
applicability of that intent to this case because, (1) the liberalization was
intended to take place without departing from realistic standards of
depreciation accounting, and (2) the changes relate primarily to computation of depreciation and, thereby, do not affect section 167(a) and
section 263(a).51

Throughout the opinion, the Court focused upon the purpose of
depreciation. T h e Code, however, evidences no congressional intent to
adopt a specific theory of depreciation. Hence, accounting theory should
only determine the tax treatment of construction-related depreciation to
the extent that a taxpayer adopts a particular theory in reporting his income.s2 Whereas the Ninth Circuit emphasized the "replacement
theory" of depreciation which supports its interpretation of the applicable Code sectionsY53
the Supreme Court adopted the "benefit theory"
and announced that the purpose of depreciation is to "allocate the
expense of using an asset to the various periods which are benefited by
that asset "54 (emphasis added).
T h e Court cited a passage in United States v . Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.55
as rejecting the "replacement theory."56 When taken in context, however, the quoted passage does not reject the "replacement theory." The
5094S. Ct. at 2767.
51Justice Douglas believes the Supreme Court is particularly ill equipped to decide tax
disputes because of the increasingly complex and technical nature of tax law and the inexperience of the Court in such matters due to its infrequent exposure to them. Nevertheless,
Justice Douglas agrees with the Ninth Circuit and would affirm its determination.
52SeeINT. REV.CODEOF 1954,s 446.
(a) General Kule. -Taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his
books.
53The "replacement theory" emphasizes cost recovery over the life of a depreciable asset to
allow for replacement of each asset when it is fully depreciated. Thus, even if the depreciation on the equipment used for construction benefits future periods cost recovery over the
longer life of the constructed improvements would be insufficient to replace the equipment
when it was depreciated. T h e Supreme Court's "benefit theory," on the other hand, requires
cost recovery over the life of the constructed improvements because the construction-related
depreciation "benefits" periods beyond its useful life.
5494 S. Ct. at 2763.
5%12 U.S. 401,415 (1973).
Whatever may be the desirability of creating a depreciation reserve under these circumstances, as a matter of good business and accounting practice, the answer is. . . "Depreciation reflects the cost of an existing capital asset, not the cost of a potential replacement."

Id. (citations omitted).
j694 S. Ct. at 2764.
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taxpayer in that case sought to depreciate equipment paid for by a
government subsidy, which required the taxpayer to replace the equipment as it became obsolete or worn out. The quoted passage merely
points out that sound accounting principles allow only depreciation of
the cost of an asset and not its potential replacement. Therefore, even
though the taxpayer was required to replace the asset, in the absence of
a cost, no depreciation was allowed.57
Neither the "replacement theory" nor the "benefit theory, when
taken out of context, completely states the purpose of depreciation.
Each theory has been derived from passages in Supreme Court cases
dealing with specific depreciation problems, but none of these passages
purported to be a complete explanation of depreciation. Both theories
recognize that depreciation is based on cost recovery allocated rationally
over the asset's useful life,58 but the crucial question is, what is a rational
allocation in a given situation? Inasmuch as every capital asset used in
construction is "consumed" and also "benefits" future periods, neither
theory furnishes a practitioner with the analytical tools necessary to
decide whether and to what extent depreciation must be capitalized.
T o bolster its application of the "benefit theory," the Court relied on
the fact that other construction-related expenses, such as the cost of labor
and materials, must be capitalized. The Court asserted that depreciation
on construction equipment, like these direct costs, is assimilated into
the cost of the capital asset constructed. I n a strict sense, however,
depreciation on automotive equipment is not "assimilated" into the
cost of a constructed building as are the construction materials that
actually become part of the building or the cost of labor incurred directly
in construction. T h e concept that depreciation is like a direct cost apparently is based on the Court's assertion that depreciation will benefit
future periods.59 But the Court's reference to the treatment of other
construction-related items is misplaced, for a strict application of the
"benefit theory" would require capitalization of many items that are
currently deductible because every cost, expenditure, or diminution in
value incurred during construction "benefits" future periods to some
degree. Thus, the "benefit test" for capitalization will be difficult to
apply because the Court did not indicate how much a cost must benefit
a future period to necessitate capitalization.
"

- ----

-

-

-

57See Parsons v. United States, 227 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1955).

Finally, it may be noted that this is one of the many situations in which the annual
allowance for depreciation may not aggregate the replacement value of the business
property. But if this is viewed as harsh or objectionable, the vice is inherent in the fact
that the present statutory scheme of depreciation allowances is based upon cost rather
than replacement value.
5*See Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960); 2 APB ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES,
s u p ~ anote 33.
j994 S. Ct. at 2765.
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A . Accounting Theory
Although accounting theory does not determine the tax treatment of
construction-related depreciation, it furnishes a more sophisticated
analysis then either the "benefit" or "replacement" theory. Accountants
do not classify depreciation as a direct cost, but as an item of overhead.60
Accountants agree that the cost of a self-constructedcapital asset includes
the cost of material and labor, but disagree on how much overhead, if
any, should be ~ a p i t a l i z e d . ~ ~
A small number of accountants believe that no overhead should be
allocated to the cost of a self-constructed capital asset.62 This approach
results in no depreciation being capitalized. A few accountants favor a
second method which would capitalize a portion of all expenses inThe third
cluding administrative expenses such as officers' ~alaries.~3
theory, which has substantial support among accountants, requires
capitalization of a portion of all overhead items related to self-construction, including fixed expenses, in the same ratio as they are normally
charged to operation^.^^ The proponents of this approach argue that no
special cost exemptions should be granted and assert that this approach
avoids undercosting self-constructed capital assets.65 This approach
capitalizes a portion of construction-related expenses such as taxes, interest, power, pension plan contributions, and depreciation. Finally,
many accountants believe that only overhead that would not be incurred
in the absence of the construction activity should be capitalized.66 The
supporters of this "incremental overhead approach" assert that some
additional costs will necessarily be incurred during self-construction.
Thus, although many fixed expenses would remain the same, other
expenses would vary almost proportionately with the amount of cons t r ~ c t i o n .The
~ ~ "incremental overhead approach" capitalizes "extra"
depreciation. Depreciation on an asset that is acquired for use in normal
operations and is used in construction when it would otherwise be idle
'~~FINN
AND
E Y~'IILLER
32; A. MATZ,0.CURRY,
COSTACCOUNTING
- PLANNING
AND CONTROL
258 (5th ed. 1972).
6 1 F AND
~ MILLER
~ ~ 382;
~ ~MEIGS412; H. SIMMONS
8: W. KARENBROCK,
INTERMEDIATE
ACCOUNTING
41 3 (4th ed. 1964).
6 * i \ i I ~412.
~~s
6 3 F AND~ MILLER
~ ~ 382.
~ The
~ "benefit theory," if carried to its extreme, would require a
portion of all costs to be capitalized.
'j4FlNNEy AND MILLER
381; MEIGS412; H. SIMONS
& W. KARENBROCK,
S U ~ T Unote 61, at 414.
See C. HORNGREN:
COSTACCOUNTING:
A MANAGERIAL
EMPHASIS
413-17 (3d ed. 1972). Overhead rates are ordinarily developed by dividing estimated total overhead by estimated total
direct-labor hours or estimated total machine hours.
'j5See note 64 supra.
6 6 F AND
~ MILLER
~ ~ 381;
~ MEIGS
~
412; A. HOLMES,
G. MAYNARD,
J. EDWARDS,
& R. MEIER,
INTERMEDIATE
ACCOUNTING
365 (Sd ed. 1958).
6 7 F 1AND
~ ~'IILLER
~ ~ ~ 381.
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is not capitalized. On the other hand, depreciation on special tools or
machinery used in self-construction becomes a part of the cost of the
constructed asset.

B. Agency-Imposed Compulsory Accounting Practices
The Federal Power Commission and the Idaho Public Utilities
Commission both require the taxpayer to capitalize construction-related
depreciation. The Court announced, in an unprecedented move, that if
the practices imposed by these agencies clearly reflect income, they are
"almost presumptively controlling of federal income tax consequences."68 This statement contradicts the Supreme Court's assertion
in Old Colony R.R.v . Commissioner that administrative accounting
procedures are made for purposes other than the determination of tax
liability under the revenue acts, and hence should not be used to determine tax liability.69
The objectives of the FPC in promulgating accounting procedures
are not the same as those of Congress in passing revenue acts. T h e FPC
formulates regulations to aid in its rate-making function. T o provide
equitable rates to all utilities, a constant ascertainable standard is vital.
The FPC, therefore, specifically lists all expenses which are to be capitalized by the utilities it controls. Under this rationale many items which
are currently deductible under the Code are required to be capitalized,
such as payroll taxes, property taxes, interest, law expenses, insurance,
relief and pension expenses, and earnings and expenses during constr~ction.~O
C. Section 263(a)
The court of appeals held that section 263(a) does not apply in the
instant case because depreciation is not an "amount paid out" within the
meaning of that section. Section 263(a) itself does not define "amount
paid out, but the regulations indicate that "amounts paid out" include
the "cost of acquisition, construction or erection of building^."^^ T h e
Supreme Court interpreted this regulation as an "administrative understanding" that "amount paid out" equates with "cost incurred," and
concluded that depreciation is a "cost incurred."72
"

"94 S. Ct. at 2766 (dictum).
6901d Colony R.R.v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932); accord, Kansas City S. Ry. v.
Commissioner, 52 F.2d 372, 377-78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 676 (1931); Barretville
Bank & Trust Co., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 749 (1958); cJ: Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. &
Loan Assn., 403 U.S. 345, 355-56 (1971).
?OFPC Reg., 18 C.F.R. 240-42 (1974).
?lSee note 10 supra.
'294 S. Ct. at 2766.
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This conclusion is unsettling for several reasons. First, there is no
specific language in the applicable regulation which indicates the phrase
"cost of acquisition, construction or erection" was intended to include
construction-related depreciation. The "cost of acquisition, construction
or erection" is listed as an "example" of section 263(a),73 but the word
"cost" is not defined. It is unreasonable to attribute a broad meaning to
"cost," which is used only as an example of an "amount paid out." If
depreciation is not "an amount paid out" within the meaning of section
263(a), it is a fortiori not a "cost" within the meaning of the regulation.
A regulation cannot expand the scope of a Code section.74
Second, if section 263(a) now extends to all "costs" of construction, the
future deductibility of other construction-related expenses is placed in
doubt. In a broad sense, interest, taxes, contributions to pension plans,
and losses are all "costs" of construction.
Third, the Court's apparent rejection of the plain meaning of the term
"amount paid out" creates confusion in that the wording of the Code
section cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the decision creates an
inconsistency in language between sections of the Code inasmuch as
similarly worded sections indicate that depreciation is not a "payment"
or "expense paid."75 Finally, the Court has, in construing section 167
in other contexts, indicated depreciation is not "paid out. "76 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has stated that Congress recognizes depreciation as a
legitimate expense even though it is a "decrease in value."77

D. Sections I61 and 261
Section 161 has not been mentioned in past decisions dealing with
construction-related depreciation.?g Courts have viewed section 161 as
primarily a mechanical drafting device.79 The Commissioner char-

73Seenote 10 supra.
74See Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas. Co. v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1953).
75See Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965); Maurice S. Gordon, 37 T.C. 986
(1962).
76Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960); see United States v. Ludey,
274 U.S. 295, 300 (1927). See also Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 431 F.
2d 664,667 (2d Cir. 1970);39 Stat. 756,768 (1916).
77Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960). The Court was concerned
with section 23(1) of the 1939 Code which is the predecessor of section 167(a) of the 1954 Code.
78Prior to the instant case, no court had determined that the requirements of both section
167(a) and section 263(a) were fulfilled.
79"Under section 161 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a generic section, a taxpayer
is entitled to take various itemized deductions in reducing gross income to taxable income."
Boone v. United States, 452 F.2d 417, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1973); see Road Mat., Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1121, 1123 n.2 (4th Cir. 1969); Zeeman v. United States, 275 F. Supp.
235,254 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),modified, 395 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1969).
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26 1

acterizes the purpose of section 161 as "priority ordering";" the taxpayer,
with no independent
however, views it as a "housekeeping pro~ision"8~
substantive impact. In the instant case, the Court, faced for the first
time with the necessity of interpreting section 161, agreed with the
Commissioner. The regulations do not support this conclusion. Treasury Regulation 1.161- 1 indicates the purpose of section 161: "Double
deductions are not permitted. Amounts deducted under one provision
of the Internal Revenue Code cannot again be deducted under any other
No double deduction occurs if the taxpayer deprovision t h e r e ~ f . ' " ~
ducts its depreciation expense under section 167(a) and does not also
capitalize under section 263(a).
The brief legislative history of section 161 also shows no "priority
ordering" purpose. The House and Senate both indicate:
This section states the general rule that in computing taxable income
there shall be allowed the deductions specifically provided in the other
sections of Part VI relating to itemized deductions for individuals and
corporations.83

The Court stated that section 26 1 also acts to establish the priority of
section 263 over 167, but the regulations do not support this conclusion
either. Treasury Regulation 1.261-1 explains that: "[I] n computing
taxable income, no deduction shall be allowed, except as otherwise expressly provided in Chapter one of the Code. . . and the regulations
thereunder."g4 The Commissioner conceded that depreciation is deductible under section 167(a) which is a "deduction expressly provided
in Chapter one of the Code. "85
The Court's technique of statutory construction is interesting but not
helpful. In construing section 263(a) the Court rejected the plain meaning of "amount paid out" because of an "administrative understanding"
derived from the regulations. On the other hand, in construing section
161, the Court relied upon the wording of the statute as establishing a
priority between sections. There is no support for this conclusion in the
judicial, administrative, or legislative history of section 161.
IV. CONCLUSION
State and federal regulations require Idaho Power to use a method
of accounting which capitalizes construction-related depreciation, and
8OBrief for Appellant at 17-18; Reply Brief for Appellant at 5-6.
81Brief for Appellee at 21 -22.
82Treas. Reg. 5 1.161-1 (1958).
83H.R. REP. NO. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A 43 (1954); S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., 195 (1954).
84Treas. Reg. 5 1.261-1 (1958).
8594 S. Ct. at 2762 n. 5.
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the Court stated that this compulsory method may control a taxpayer's
income tax consequences. The Court's decision in the instant case may
allow a different result where taxpayers are free to choose an acceptable
accounting method. For example, the Tax Court has recognized the
"incremental overhead method "86 as clearly reflecting inc0me.8~Under
this method, if a taxpayer does not acquire special tools or machinery
for use in self-construction activities, the taxpayer will not capitalize
any depreciation on its books. Following the Court's interpretation of
the role of section 446, a taxpayer's method of accounting which clearly
reflects income would be "almost presumptively controlling of federal
income tax consequences."~8 Under this rationale, a taxpayer would not
capitalize any depreciation on its books or on its tax return.
Nevertheless, some taxpayers that use the "incremental overhead
method" will capitalize construction-related depreciation. For instance,
the Idaho Power Company will probably purchase some additional
equipment to use in its ongoing large-scale construction activities. On
the other hand, much of the automotive equipment involved in the instant case might have been purchased for use in normal operations and
used in construction only when it would otherwise be temporarily idle.
The incremental overhead analysis is theoretically sounder than the
Court's "benefit theory" in determining what self-construction expenses
to capitalize.

Federal Tax Liens -ASSIGNMENT
OF ACCOUNTS
- THE"NO PROPRULEUNDER
THE 1966 FEDERAL
TAX
LIENACTAND ARTICLE
9 OF
THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL
CODE-Nevada Rock Q Sand Co. u. United
States, 376 F. Supp. 161 (D. Nev. 1974).
ERTY"

Coop Oil Products, Inc. (Coop) contracted with Nevada Rock & Sand
Co. (NRSC) to perform certain construction work. In exchange for
materials to complete its contract, Coop assigned to Witco Chemical
Corporation (Witco) all monies due or to become due under the NRSC
contract. Notice of the assignment was sent to N RSC which consented to
make payment directly to Witco upon completion of Coop's performance. Witco failed to file notice of the Coop assignment as required by
Nevada's Uniform Commercial Code. Subsequently, Coop completed
performance of the NRSC contract, and approximately $10,000 became
due and payable to Witco under the assignment. Prior to payment by
NRSC of the amount due, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed
delinquent taxes against Coop and, upon Coop's failure to pay the taxes,
86See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
87Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. 275,285 (1967).
8894 S. Ct. at 2766.

